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We study infinitely repeated games that are played by many groups simulta-
neously and where players have the option to maintain or quit relationships. For
two-player stage games any individually rational payoff vector in the relative in-
terior of V∗ can be sustained as equilibrium payoff if the discount factor δ is suf-
ficiently large. Such a statement is not possible for stage games with more than
two players. We translate the refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness to our
framework and characterize the set of payoffs that can be sustained through strate-
gies that are “bilaterally rational” in the sense of Ghosh and Ray (1996). (JEL:
C70, C72)
1 Introduction
Most of the literature on infinitely repeated games or relational contracts considers
settings with exogenously given matching protocols: Either a player is forced to play
against a fixed set of opponents all the time, or she plays against different opponents
in each period (e.g., Kandori, 1992, or Ellison, 1994). However, in almost all social
and economic interactions individuals are free to quit relationships and establish
new ones. In this paper, we therefore study the equilibrium set in infinitely repeated
games with the option to maintain or to quit relationships.
The setup is as follows. An N-player normal-form game is played simultaneously
in M groups. After observing the opponents’ action choice, each player can choose
whether to maintain the relationship with her current group or not. If at least one
player of a group quits the relationship, all players of this group return to a pool of
unmatched players, from which new groups are formed randomly at the beginning
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of the next period. With probability 1 − δ a player “dies” and will be replaced in
the next period by a new player who joins the pool of unmatched players. With
probability δ she survives until the next period. If all players of a group maintain
the relationship and survive the period, they play the stage game against each other
again. A player only observes the identity of current and former opponents and the
actions these players have chosen in the periods in which she played the stage game
with them. There are no information flows between groups.
Similar settings have been analyzed in a number of papers; see Datta (1993),
Kranton (1996), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Carmichael and MacLeod (1997), Fujiwara-
Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009), Rob and Yang (2010), and Schumacher (2013).1
The focus of these papers is cooperation in the two-player prisoners’ dilemma. To
sustain cooperation in equilibrium players can start small: At the beginning of
a new relationship, players defect and start to cooperate in later periods.2 Whenever
a player deviates from this path of play, her opponent quits the relationship. Thus,
any gain from deviation is wiped out by the subsequent phase of low payoffs in the
next relationship.3
In contrast to the previous literature, we allow for any finite stage game. Our object
of interest is the set of payoff vectors that can be supported as expected normalized
equilibrium payoffs for all players, regardless of the number M of groups. Recall
that any individually rational payoff vector v ∈ V ∗ can be sustained in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the canonical infinitely repeated game if the discount factor δ
is sufficiently large (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). This folk theorem does not
hold in our framework. However, by using starting-small strategies, we show that
any payoff vector in the relative interior of those payoffs, if it strictly dominates
a convex combination of Nash payoffs of the stage game, can be supported as
expected normalized equilibrium payoff if δ is sufficiently large. Our first main
result is an almost complete characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs for
two-player stage games. If N = 2, any individually rational payoff vector v in
the relative interior of V ∗ can be sustained in an equilibrium, provided that δ is
sufficiently large. Hence, for two-player stage games and large discount factors δ,
the set of equilibrium payoffs in the infinitely repeated game with the option to
maintain or to quit relationships is almost identical to the one in the canonical
repeated game. In contrast, for stage games with more than two player roles, the
option to quit relationships may greatly reduce the set of equilibrium payoffs. We
1 The option to maintain or to quit relationships has also been considered in other
settings; see Matsushima (1990) or Casas-Arce (2010). Jackson and Watts (2008,
2010) analyze the existence of equilibria in finitely repeated games where players
choose both actions and opponents.
2 Starting-small strategies have also been analyzed experimentally; see Andreoni
and Samuelson (2006).
3 Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) show that there also can be an equi-
librium where a fraction of players start to cooperate immediately (and quit the rela-
tionship whenever the opponent defects) and all other players choose a starting-small
strategy with one period of defection.
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show by example that individually rational payoffs close to the minmax payoff
profile are not always equilibrium payoffs.
We then turn to the renegotiation-proofness of starting-small strategies. Ghosh
and Ray (1996) argue that starting-small strategies may not be robust against joint
deviations, since players have an incentive to drop the phase of low payoffs at the
beginning of a relationship and start cooperation immediately. In several papers,
this problem is solved by assuming incomplete information about players’ types.
For example, a player may be patient or myopic; see Ghosh and Ray (1996) or
Rob and Yang (2010). We show that even in games with complete information and
homogeneous time preferences, starting-small strategies can be robust to joint de-
viations. Following Farrell and Maskin (1989), we construct equilibrium strategies
in which, at the beginning of a new relationship (and after any unilateral devia-
tion), a profile is played that punishes one player and rewards her opponent. Our
second main result is a characterization of payoff profiles that can be sustained in
a “weakly group-specific renegotiation-proof equilibrium” (below we define this
term formally).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
framework. Section 3 provides a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs
that holds for any number M of groups. In section 4, we adapt Farrell and Maskin’s
(1989) refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness to our framework. Section 5
concludes. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Framework of the Model
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {0,1, ...}. In each period, an N-player normal-
form game G is played in M ∈ N groups. In each group, there is exactly one player
of each player role i ∈ {1, ..., N}. There is no discounting. However, at the end of
period t, each player dies with probability 1 − δ and is replaced by a new player
who takes on the same role. With probability δ she survives the period.4 A player’s
identity is denoted by i · m · g, where g represents her generation. If player i · m · g
dies, she is replaced by player i · m · (g + 1). In period 0, we have g = 1 for all
players.
At the beginning of a period, each player is either matched in a group or un-
matched. All unmatched players are matched randomly into groups.5 Thus, all
players who are alive in a given period play G in some group. Denote the group of
player i · m · g in period t by the set rti·m·g, which includes i · m · g and the identities
4 Thus, δ can be interpreted as the usual discount factor. Including both discounting
and random death would not affect our results.
5 By construction, there are the same number of players of each role in the pool of
unmatched players. All possible ways of pairing up these players have the same prob-
ability. The assumption of random matching is a shortcut to the formation of groups
through partner choice. Our results would not change if players could avoid being
matched to previous opponents when there are others in the pool of unmatched play-
ers.
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of her opponents in this period. We say that player i · m · g starts in a new group in
period t if rti·m·g = rt−1i·m·g.
In each period, players in role i choose an action from the pure finite action set Ai .
Denote the action chosen by player i · m · g in period t by ati·m·g. The set of mixed
actions for players in role i is Δ(Ai); the set of pure action profiles is A ≡ ∏Ni=1 Ai
with typical element a; and the set of mixed action profiles is Δ(A) ≡ ∏Ni=1 Δ(Ai)
with typical element α. Mixed actions are not observable. The action profile realized
in the group of i · m · g in period t is given by at,i·m·g.6 Stage-game payoffs are given
by a function u : A → RN . Let u(α) be the vector of expected payoffs from a mixed
action profile α.
After the action profile is realized, each player has the option to maintain (MT ) or
to quit (Q) the relationship with her current group. If at least one player of a given
group chooses Q or if at least one player of this group dies, all members of this
group join the pool of unmatched players (together with the new players) at the
beginning of the next period. Otherwise, all players of this group remain matched
together for one more period. The sequence of events in each period is as follows:
(i) Unmatched players are matched randomly into groups; (ii) all players choose
their actions, and payoffs are realized; (iii) each player chooses between MT and Q;
(iv) players die and are replaced by new players with probability 1 − δ, groups in
which all players have chosen MT and survive the period stay together, and all other
players enter the pool of unmatched players together with the new ones.
Players recall the history of play in their own groups. In each period t, they also
observe the realization wt of a public correlation device before matching occurs,
i.e., before stage (i). Assume that wt is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Let ti·m·g be
the period in which player i · m · g plays G for the first time (her period of birth).
The history of play for player i · m · g in a period t > ti·m·g is then given by
hti·m·g = (aτ,i·m·g,wτ)τ∈{ti·m·g ,...,t−1} .
Let H be the set that includes all possible finite histories of play, including the empty
history. The history of groups for this player is given by
Rti·m·g =
(
rτi·m·g
)
τ∈{ti·m·g ,...,t}
.
Let R be the set that includes all possible finite histories of groups, including the
empty history. The strategy σi of players in role i consists of two parts, action choice
and matching decision. The action choice is a function that maps the period of birth,
the identity (i.e., the numbers m and g), the history of play, the history of groups,
and the current realization of the public signal into the set of mixed actions,
σ
[1]
i : N3 × H × R × [0, 1] → Δ(Ai) .
The matching decision is a function that maps the period of birth, the identity, the
history of play, the history of groups, the current realization of the public signal,
and the realized action profile into the set of mixed matching decisions,
σ
[2]
i : N3 × H × R × [0, 1] × A → Δ({Q, MT }) .
6 We will sometimes suppress the notation for individual players.
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Note that each player in role i may act differently from all the others. For a given
strategy profile σ = {σi}i∈{1,...,N} one can calculate the expected normalized payoff
of player i · m · g at her birth, which is
(1 − δ)Eσ
⎡
⎣
∞∑
t=ti·m·g
δt−ti·m·g ui(at,i·m·g) | ti·m·g, m, g
⎤
⎦ .
As a player only observes the action profiles realized in her own groups, we have
a game of imperfect information. Our solution concept is sequential equilibrium.
A sequential equilibrium requires a strategy profile and a system of beliefs that are
sequentially rational and consistent, respectively. We will restrict attention to a class
of strategy profiles in which every player conditions her action choices only on her
observations. Each of our strategy profiles is sequentially rational for any belief
a player may have about the unobserved actions chosen by players in other groups.
Hence, beliefs are not modeled explicitly, and a sequential equilibrium is said to
exist when the condition of sequential rationality is fulfilled. The set of payoffs
generated by pure action profiles is
V ≡ {v ∈ RN : ∃ a ∈ A s.t. v = u(a)} ,
while the set of feasible payoffs V † is given by the convex hull of V , i.e., V † ≡ co(V ).
The min–max payoff for a player in role i is given by
vˆi = min
α−i∈
∏
j =i Δ(A j )
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, α−i) ;
the corresponding min–max profile is αˆi . The set of individually rational payoffs is
V ∗ ≡ {v ∈ V † : vi > vˆi, i = 1, ..., N
}
.
Let ΣNE ⊂ Δ(A) be the set of all Nash equilibria of G. By Nash’s (1951) existence
theorem, this set has at least one element. The set of payoffs generated by Nash
equilibria is
VNE ≡
{
v ∈ RN : ∃ α ∈ ΣNE s.t. v = u(α)} ,
while the set of feasible Nash payoffs V †NE is the convex hull of VNE , V
†
NE ≡ co(VNE).
The set of feasible payoffs that strictly dominate a convex combination of Nash
payoffs is
V ∗NE ≡
{
v ∈ V † : ∃ v¯ ∈ V †NE s.t. vi > v¯i, i = 1, ..., N
}
.
Finally, define role i’s cheating payoff from the action profile a by
ci(a) = max
aˆi∈Ai
ui(aˆi, a−i), vmaxi = max
a∈A
ui(a), and vmini = min
a∈A
ui(a) .
3 A Folk Theorem for Any Number of Groups
In a finite population, there is always a positive probability of being paired up
with the same opponents after choosing Q in the preceding period. Suppose that
all players choose MT in each period. An increase in δ then has two effects: first,
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it increases the value of future payoffs, and second, it increases the probability of
being paired up with the same opponents again after choosing Q (because it is less
likely that a player from another group dies). As players can condition their actions
on the identity of their opponents, there is scope for punishment within a group. It
is then simple to establish the folk theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for
our framework: For given M, if the dimension of V † equals N , then for any v ∈ V ∗
there is a value δ¯ < 1 such that there is a sequential equilibrium in which vi is the
expected normalized payoff for each player in role i whenever δ ≥ δ¯.7
The finite size of the population may also allow for cooperation through conta-
gious strategies as in Ellison (1994). Suppose that the stage game G is the prisoners’
dilemma, and that all players always choose Q. Then in each period all players are
rematched, and no player can maintain a relationship by unilaterally choosing MT
(hence, choosing Q is optimal). A contagious strategy works as follows: if a player
defects in period t, then she continues defecting, her opponent starts defecting in
period t + 1, the opponent’s opponent starts defecting in period t + 2, and so forth.
Thus, a single deviation triggers a breakdown of cooperation, which punishes the
initial deviator. For given M, if δ is sufficiently large, the threat of breakdown may
induce players to cooperate in each period.
However, we are interested in the set of equilibrium payoffs when the population
is so large that it is unlikely to be matched to the same opponents after choosing Q,
and contagious strategies no longer work because contagion would be too slow to
deter defection. We can show formally that for given δ, if M is sufficiently large,
no equilibrium exists in which a profile that is not Nash is played in all groups and
periods.
LEMMA 1 For given δ < 1, there is M¯ ∈ N such that there is no equilibrium in
which all groups play a profile α /∈ ΣNE in all periods if M > M¯.
In the prisoners’ dilemma, the payoff from mutual cooperation is not an equilib-
rium payoff for given δ if M is sufficiently large. Thus, for many stage games, V ∗ is
no longer the set of equilibrium payoffs for large δ and arbitrary M.
Nevertheless, there is at least one possibility to support the repeated play of
profiles that are not Nash equilibria of the stage game, regardless of M. Suppose that
a stage game has two action profiles α1 ∈ ΣNE and a2 ∈ A\ΣNE with ui(α1) < ui(a2)
for all i. Let T ∈ N, and consider following strategy for player i · m · g: Always
choose MT ; in period t, choose a2i if rt−1i·m·g = rti·m·g and at−1,i·m·g = a2 or if rτi·m·g = rti·m·g
and aτi·m·g = α1i in all periods τ ∈ {t − T, ..., t − 1}; otherwise, choose ati = α1i .
This is a version of the starting-small strategy mentioned in the introduction: when
the members of a new group are matched together, a Nash profile α1 is played for T
periods. Call this the punishment phase. Afterwards, the group plays a profile a2,
which is more favorable for all players. Call this the normal phase. The punishment
phase is also triggered when some player in role i deviates from a2i . If all players in
7 The assumption of full dimensionality can be replaced by the weaker assumption
of nonequivalent utilities (Abreu, Dutta, and Smith, 1994).
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all groups play according to this strategy and T and δ are sufficiently large, then any
gain from deviation is wiped out by the subsequent punishment phase, regardless of
whether the deviator is matched to the same group or not.
Formally, we say that an equilibrium σ consists of starting-small strategies if
it has the following properties. Players always choose MT . There are two action
profiles (or public randomizations) α1 and α2 as well as some T ∈ N such that on
the equilibrium path each player in role i who starts in a new group chooses α1i in
the first T periods of this group, and α2i in each period thereafter until the group is
broken up.
By using starting-small strategies, we can establish a partial characterization of
the equilibrium payoffs that holds for any number M of groups.
LEMMA 2 For any v in the relative interior8 of V ∗NE, there is a value δ¯ < 1 such that
if δ > δ¯, then there is a sequential equilibrium in which the expected normalized
payoff for each player in role i equals vi .
Starting-small strategies may support an equilibrium even if the punishment-
phase profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and the period payoff
in the normal phase does not dominate a convex combination of Nash payoffs.
However, if the punishment-phase profile is not a Nash equilibrium, we additionally
have to rule out that some players can profitably deviate in the punishment phase.
Consequently, not every action profile with an individually rational payoff vector can
be used as normal-phase profile in general. This makes a complete characterization
of all equilibrium payoff vectors for arbitrary M difficult and reduces the set of
equilibrium payoffs. An example illustrates this point.
Example 1. Consider the three-player stage game in Figure 1, in which a player
in role 1 chooses rows, a player in role 2 chooses columns, and a player in role 3
chooses matrices. The min–max payoffs are vˆ1 = vˆ2 = vˆ3 = 0, and thus, a payoff
of 1 is individually rational for each player. We show that no equilibrium σ achieves
this payoff profile for arbitrary M.
Figure 1
Stage Game from Example 1
X L C R
T 10,10,10 10,1,1 0,0,0
P 1,1,1 0,10,0 0,10,0
B 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
Y L C R
T 10,10,1 10,1,1 10,10,10
C 1,1,10 1,10,0 10,10,10
B 1,1,10 1,1,10 1,1,10
8 Recall that for the affine hull aff(V∗NE ) = {
∑n
j=1 λ j u(a[ j]) : n ∈ N, a[ j] ∈ A,∑n
j=1 λ j = 1} the relative interior of V∗NE is those points v ∈ aff(V∗NE ) for which
there exists an ε > 0 such that if v′ ∈ aff(V∗NE ) and d(v, v′) ≤ ε, then v′ ∈ V∗NE ,
where d is the Euclidean distance.
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As a preliminary step, we define a virgin group for i · m · g (with g ≥ 2) as
a group r in which (i) all roles are taken by players in generation 2 or later, (ii) no
two players interacted with each other in previous periods, and (iii) no sequence of
players x1, x2, ..., xn with xn ∈ r exists such that i · m · g has interacted with x1, x1
has interacted with x2, ..., and xn−1 has interacted with xn . Clearly, if M and t
become large, the probability that i · m · g is matched to a virgin group for her after
choosing Q converges to 1.
Now assume by contradiction that an equilibrium σ exists in which the normal-
ized expected payoff for all players equals 1. In a virgin group (for some player),
the expected normalized payoff of each player must be 1 (because with positive
probability she was just born and then by definition must earn 1 in expectation). The
probability that an action is played in this group that yields some player a payoff
of 10, say i · m · g, cannot exceed 1/10. Otherwise, if M and t are sufficiently large,
player i · m · g could choose Q (to get matched to another virgin group for her) and
thereby increase her expected normalized payoff. Hence, with a probability of at
least 7/10 one of the remaining actions must be played, i.e., {T, R, X}, {P, L, X},
{B, L, X}, {B,C, X}, or {B, R, X}. However, when such an action is played, the player
in role 3 can increase her period payoff from 0 or 1 to 10 by choosing Y . If M and t
are sufficiently large, this player can secure herself an expected normalized payoff
above 1 by choosing Y and Q, a contradiction.
For two-player games individual rationality becomes meaningful again. By play-
ing the mutual min–max profile {αˆ21, αˆ12}, both players earn a period payoff that is
strictly below any individually rational payoff. Also, by choosing a best response
to αˆi−i , a player in role i earns vˆi , which again is strictly below any individually
rational payoff. Using this fact, we get an almost complete characterization of all
equilibrium payoffs.
PROPOSITION 1 Assume that N = 2. For any v in the relative interior of V ∗, there
is a value δ¯ < 1 such that if δ > δ¯, then there is a sequential equilibrium in which
the expected normalized payoff for each player in role i equals vi .
Example 2. Even for two-player games we cannot hope for a simple and complete
characterization of equilibrium payoffs for arbitrary M. Consider the stage game G1
in Figure 2. A player in role 1 chooses rows, and a player in role 2 chooses columns.
Figure 2
Stage Game from Example 2 (G1)
G1 D C
D 1,1 3,0
C 0,0 2,2
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is {D, D}, and the min–max pay-
offs are vˆ1 = 1 and vˆ2 = 2/3. The convex combinations of u({D, D}) and u({C, C})
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Figure 3
The Set of Feasible and Individually Rational Payoffs in G1 (left) and G2 (right)
are located at the boundary of V ∗ (see Figure 3). By constructing a starting-small
strategy with {D, D} as punishment-phase profile and a public randomization (using
{D, D} and {C, C}) as normal-phase profile, we can establish any of these convex
combinations – except u({C,C}) – as equilibrium payoff for all players, provided
that δ is sufficiently large. Hence, individually rational payoff profiles v /∈ V †NE
located at the boundary of V ∗ can be equilibrium payoffs for all players and arbi-
trary M.
Next, consider the stage game G2 in Figure 4, where a player in role 1 chooses
rows and a player in role 2 chooses columns. The min–max payoffs are vˆ1 = vˆ2 = 0.
The convex combinations of u({P,C}) and u({P, R}) are located at the boundary
of V ∗ (see Figure 3). One of these convex combinations (a payoff of 2 for each
player) is the payoff of a Nash equilibrium of the stage game where the player in
role 1 (role 2) chooses P and B (C and R) with equal probability. We show that
none of the other convex combinations is an equilibrium payoff profile for arbitrary
large M.
Figure 4
Stage Game from Example 2 (G2)
G2 L C R
T 0,0 0,0 0,0
P 0,0 0,4 4,0
B 0,0 4,0 0,4
Assume by contradiction that an equilibrium σ exists in which the expected
normalized payoffs of players in roles 1 and 2 are v1 = 2 and 4 − v1, respectively.
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Without loss of generality we assume v1 < 2. Since the expected normalized payoff
profile is a linear combination of the stage-game payoffs, an action profile with
period payoffs (4, 0) or (0, 4) must be played in all periods and groups. Thus, on the
equilibrium path, players in role 1 (role 2) always choose action P or B (C or R).
Consider the following alternative strategy for a player in role 1 and g ≥ 2: In
each period, she plays a best response to the profile that is supposed to be played
in her current group and quits the relationship. If M and t are sufficiently large,
she mostly plays in virgin groups for her, in which, by definition, the opponent
in role 2 chooses C or R. In these groups, she earns a period payoff of at least 2
in expectation. Hence, for M → ∞ and t → ∞ her expected normalized payoff
from the alternative strategy converges to 2 > v1, a contradiction. We conclude that
feasible and individually rational payoff profiles v located at the boundary of V ∗
may or may not be equilibrium payoffs for all players and arbitrary M, depending
on the structure of the stage game.
4 Renegotiation-Proofness
If we consider the punishment phase of a starting-small strategy, it is evident that
players who have just been matched together in a new group may want to drop
the punishment and start with the normal phase immediately. Given that all other
players stick to the starting-small strategy, no player of this group could increase
her payoff by deviating in the normal phase. Consider, for example, the prisoners’
dilemma G3 in Figure 5, in which a player in role 1 chooses rows, and a player in
role 2 chooses columns.
Figure 5
Prisoners’ Dilemma G3
G3 D C
D 1,1 5,0
C 0,5 4,4
A starting-small strategy with mutual defection {D, D} as punishment-phase pro-
file and mutual cooperation {C, C} as normal-phase profile sustains an equilibrium,
provided that δ is sufficiently large. If a newly matched group r starts with the
normal phase immediately and complies with the starting-small strategy in all fu-
ture periods, these players increase their expected discounted payoff by 3. Since all
other groups play according to the starting-small strategy (now and in the future),
the players of r cannot deviate profitably from this agreement. Hence, it is credi-
ble. However, if all groups always drop the punishment phase, we are no longer in
equilibrium.
Ghosh and Ray (1996) call this problem of the starting-small strategy a lack
of bilateral rationality. Under complete information, equilibria in starting-small
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strategies may not be robust to Pareto-improving and incentive-compatible joint
deviations.
In this section, we examine the circumstances under which a starting-small strat-
egy exists that sustains the repeated play of profiles α /∈ ΣNE in equilibrium and is
robust to this criticism. To capture the concept of bilateral rationality formally, we
adopt Farrell and Maskin’s (1989) refinement of weak renegotiation-proofness for
two-player games to our setting.9 This refinement seems to be related to bilateral
rationality: It rules out strategy profiles σ (as defined in the canonical repeated game)
in which some continuation equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by another continua-
tion equilibrium of σ . To illustrate this, consider again the prisoners’ dilemma G3.
Suppose that two players in the canonical repeated game play the grim-trigger strat-
egy “Choose C unless at least one player has chosen D in the past; in this case,
choose D.” For sufficiently large δ, this strategy sustains cooperation in equilibrium.
However, the phase of mutual defection punishes both players. Thus, they may
agree to start the game anew with mutual cooperation. The grim-trigger strategy
is therefore not robust to renegotiations. Formally, weak renegotiation-proofness is
defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1 (WEAK RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS; FARRELL AND MASKIN,
1989) A subgame-perfect equilibrium σ (as defined for the canonical repeated
game) is weakly renegotiation-proof if there do not exist continuation equilibria σ1,
σ2 of σ such that σ1 strictly Pareto-dominates σ2.
Farrell and Maskin (1989) construct weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria by
using profiles that punish the deviator and benefit her opponent. Consider again the
prisoners’ dilemma G3. In the canonical repeated game, mutual cooperation can
be supported for sufficiently large δ by playing {C, D} as punishment profile when
player 1 has deviated and {D, C} as punishment profile when player 2 has deviated.
Then there exists no continuation equilibrium that Pareto-dominates another one.
More generally, they show that any v ∈ V ∗ is the payoff of a weakly renegotiation-
proof equilibrium if δ is sufficiently large and there exist actions a1 , a2 with ci(ai) < vi
and ui(a−i) ≥ vi .
This refinement should – if we can define it for our framework – rule out that both
players want to skip the punishment phase of a starting-small strategy. Its adaptation
to our framework is somewhat tricky. First, we have to decide when players can
negotiate. Second, we have to be specific about what a continuation equilibrium is
in our game (note that in our framework, a strategy σi not only describes how to
play in the current group, but also in all future groups).
With respect to the first issue, we rule out negotiations among players who are
not matched with each other (there are no information flows between groups).
Players can negotiate (1) after being matched together (i.e., after the outcome of the
9 As Farrell and Maskin (1989) note, the concept of renegotiation-proofness might
no longer be appropriate for games with more than two players if they can negotiate in
coalitions that are strictly smaller than the number of players.
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randomization device is made public), before choosing their action, and (2) after
actions have been taken, before choosing between MT and Q.
With respect to the second issue, we have to restrict attention to strategies that
imply the same path of play in every group. We call a strategy σi group-independent
if (1) the matching decision is always MT , and (2) the action choice of a player
in role i only depends on the public signals and action profiles realized in her
current group.10 Note that a starting-small strategy is group-independent. We provide
a formal definition.
DEFINITION 2 (GROUP-INDEPENDENCE) A strategy σi is group-independent if the
matching decision is always MT and the action choice in period t only depends on
{(aτ , wτ)}τ∈{t∗,...,t}, where t∗ is the last period such that rt∗−1 = rt∗ and rτ = rt∗ for
all τ ∈ {t∗, ..., t − 1}.
If a strategy σi is group-independent, it can be described by an adjunct strategy σˆi:
H × [0,1] → Δ(Ai) that maps the history of play in the current group and the current
realization of the public signal into the set of mixed actions. This adjunct strategy
essentially works like a strategy in the canonical repeated game. It is the same object
as in the definition of weak renegotiation-proofness in Farrell and Maskin (1989).
In particular, a continuation equilibrium of an adjunct strategy profile σˆ = {σˆ1, σˆ2}
is well defined. Now we can adapt weak renegotiation-proofness to our framework:
DEFINITION 3 (WEAK gs-RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS) An equilibrium σ in
group-independent strategies and its adjunct strategy profile σˆ are weakly gs-
renegotiation-proof if, whenever players can negotiate, there do not exist continua-
tion equilibria σˆ1, σˆ2 of σˆ such that σˆ1 strictly Pareto-dominates σˆ2.
Compared to the definition in Farrell and Maskin (1989), this definition addition-
ally includes the phrase “whenever players can negotiate.” The reason for this is that
newly matched players can only negotiate in period t after the public signal wt has
been realized. Below we illustrate why this is important.
An equilibrium in starting-small strategies is weakly gs-renegotiation-proof only
if at the beginning of a relationship at least one player weakly prefers to start play in
the punishment phase. The starting-small strategy described at the beginning of this
section is therefore not weakly gs-renegotiation-proof. Moreover, deviations must
be punished in a way so that all players weakly prefer to maintain the relationship.
The next example shows that both objectives can be achieved by using the public
correlation device.
Example 3. Consider again the prisoners’ dilemma G3. We construct a starting-
small strategy with {C, C} as normal-phase profile that supports a weakly gs-
renegotiation-proof equilibrium when δ is sufficiently large: each player always
10 Thus, it does not depend on her period of birth, her identity, the identity of the
other group members, or what happened in previous groups (none of these objects ex-
ists in the canonical repeated game).
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chooses MT ; if a player starts in a new group in period t, profile {D, C} is played if
wt ∈ [0,1/2], and profile {C, D} is played if wt ∈ (1/2,1]; after this, profile {C,C} is
played until a player deviates unilaterally from this profile or the group is broken up
exogenously; whenever the player in role 1 (role 2) deviates unilaterally from this
path of play (i.e., in the punishment or the normal phase), profile {C, D} ({D, C}) is
played in the subsequent period τ (given that the same group is matched together)
if wτ ∈ [5/8,1], and profile {C, C} otherwise; after this punishment, players return
to the repeated play of {C, C}; there is no punishment for bilateral deviations.
We show that this strategy supports a weakly gs-renegotiation-proof equilibrium
if δ is sufficiently close to 1. Observe that after any unilateral deviation from this
strategy profile, a player either is punished by her opponent or plays in a new group.
In the former case, she earns 5/8 × 4 + 3/8 × 0 = 5/2 in expectation in the next
period, while in the latter case, she earns 1/2 × 5 + 1/2 × 0 = 5/2. The expected
payoffs that occur after the next period are the same in both cases. Hence, she weakly
prefers to maintain the relationship after her deviation (though she knows that she
will be punished with positive probability in the next period). In each phase, the
gain from deviation is 1, while the loss from not playing the normal-phase profile
is 4 − 5/2 = 3/2. Thus, if δ is sufficiently large, there is no profitable deviation.
Note that in each phase and after any signal, at least one player weakly prefers
maintaining the current continuation equilibrium to switching to an alternative one.
We therefore have derived a weakly gs-renegotiation-proof equilibrium in starting-
small strategies.
The timing of public randomization is crucial for this solution. It must occur
before new groups are matched together. If the players of a new group are able to
negotiate continuation play before the outcome of the randomization device is made
public, they again could increase expected payoffs by dropping the punishment
phase.
We now generalize the example.
PROPOSITION 2 Assume that there are action profiles a, a1, a2 ∈ A with
ci(a
i) < ui(a) ≤ ui(a−i)(1)
and
max
{
ci(a
i) − ui(ai), vmaxi − ui(a)
}
< ui(a) − 12
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)(2)
for i ∈ {1,2}. For any ε > 0 there is a value δ¯ < 1 such that if δ > δ¯, then a weakly gs-
renegotiation-proof sequential equilibrium exists in which the expected normalized
payoff for each player in role i is at most ε away from ui(a).
The conditions (1) and (2) guarantee that we can construct a starting-small strategy
that has a as normal-phase profile and supports a weakly gs-renegotiation-proof
equilibrium. The profiles a1 and a2 are played in the punishment phase and after
deviations. The condition (1) is the same as in Farrell and Maskin (1989). It requires
that we can use ai to punish a player in role i and at the same time reward her
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opponent in role −i. The condition (2) is new. The left-hand side of (2) is the
maximum of what a player in role i gains by deviating from profile a, a1, or a2.
The right-hand side of (2) is what a player in role i loses when she starts in a new
group instead of being in the normal phase, given that a1, a2 are played with
equal probability in the punishment phase. The condition (2) is sufficient, but not
necessary, for Proposition 2 to hold. Consider, for example, the game G in Figure 6,
in which a player in role 1 chooses rows, and a player in role 2 chooses columns.
A starting-small strategy with {C, D} as punishment-phase profile and {C, C} as
normal-phase profile can constitute a weakly gs-renegotiation-proof equilibrium
such that the claim of Proposition 2 holds for u(a) = u({C, C}). However, there
exist no profiles a1, a2 that satisfy (2) when u(a) = u({C, C}).
Figure 6
Stage Game G
G D C
D 0,0 2,0
C 0.9,1 1,1
In the proof of Proposition 2, we construct a profile in starting-small strategies
with the following properties. The punishment phase endures for only one period.
The same is true for punishments after unilateral deviations in the punishment phase.
Unilateral deviations in the normal phase are punished in a way such that no player
strictly wishes to quit the current relationship.
The requirement of weak gs-renegotiation-proofness severely restricts the set of
action profiles that can be used as normal-phase profile. The maximal gains from
deviating in the punishment phase must not be too high relative to the payoff in the
normal phase. The following example illustrates this.
Example 4. Consider the prisoners’ dilemma G4 in Figure 7. A player in role 1
chooses rows, and a player in role 2 chooses columns. It is identical to G3 except
that the payoff from mutual defection is 2 instead of 1.
Figure 7
Stage Game from Example 4
G4 D C
D 2,2 0,5
C 0,5 4,4
To sustain a weakly gs-renegotiation-proof equilibrium in starting-small strategies
with a = {C, C} as normal-phase profile, only a1 = {C, D} and a2 = {D, C} can
be played in the punishment phase. Note that with a = {C, C}, a1 = {C, D}, and
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a2 = {D,C} the condition (2) is violated. Assume that a1 and a2 are played with
equal probability in the punishment phase and that this phase endures for one period
(the argument below extends to any probability distribution and any length of the
punishment phase). Let δ be close to 1, and M large enough that the probability
of starting in a new group after choosing Q is close to 1. Now suppose that the
action profile a1 is to be played in a new group. By complying with the starting-
small strategy, the player in role 1 earns ≈ 0 + 4δ + 4δ2 + 4δ3 + · · · in expectation.
However, by playing D and Q in the current period and complying thereafter,
this player will earn ≈ 2 + 5δ/2 + 4δ2 + 4δ3 + · · · in expectation, which is strictly
more than the payoff from compliance. Hence, no weakly gs-renegotiation-proof
equilibrium in starting-small strategies with a = {C, C} as normal-phase profile
exists for arbitrary M.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the equilibrium set of infinitely repeated games in which players can
quit relationships to find new opponents. We found a structural difference between
stage games with two player roles and games with more than two player roles. For
two-player games, any individual rational payoff vector in the relative interior of V ∗
can be an equilibrium payoff for sufficiently large δ. For these games, the option to
quit relationships has almost no effect on the set of equilibrium payoffs. By example
we showed that such a statement is not possible for games with more than two player
roles. Individual rational payoff profiles in the relative interior of V ∗ may not be
equilibrium payoffs. We then translated Farrell and Maskin’s (1989) refinement of
weak renegotiation-proofness to our framework and provided a characterization of
the set of payoffs that can be supported through strategies that are to some extent
robust to negotiations between players. In particular, we showed that starting-small
strategies that support cooperation in equilibrium can be bilaterally rational in the
sense of Ghosh and Ray (1996).
It remains an open question to what extent the option to switch opponents affects
the set of equilibrium payoffs. In our framework, players were not allowed to choose
their opponents. It may be possible to prove a complete folk theorem when players
can force a deviator to remain in the current group and to accept punishment (the
model then must specify which option is stronger if one player wants to leave her
group while her opponents want the group to stay together). Further research may
illuminate which institutions affect the exchange of players between groups and
thereby the scope for cooperation.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that such an equilibrium exists for given M and δ. Then each new player
in role i plays αi at least until she observes that a different profile is played. As
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α /∈ ΣNE , there is at least one role j with c j(α) > u j(α). Now assume that player
j · m · g chooses a best response against α− j in period t j·m·g and plays α j and Q in
each period thereafter. We calculate an upper bound N¯(τ) on the number of players
at the beginning of period τ > t j·m·g who have observed a profile different from α. In
period t j·m·g + 1 this number is N − 1, in period t j·m·g + 2 it is N(N − 1), in period
t j·m·g + 3 it is N2(N − 1), and so forth. Thus, we have N¯(τ) = Nt j·m·g−τ−1(N − 1)
for any τ > t j·m·g . Note that in each period, the probability that there are m ≤ M
players of each role in the pool of unmatched players is at least (when all players
choose MT )
(
M
m
)
(1 − δN)m(δN)M−m ,
which for given m converges to 0 as M grows large. Thus, the probability that in
period τ > t j·m·g player j · m · g is in a group where profile α is played (given that
she has survived up to this period) is at least
P(τ, M) =
M∑
m=N¯(τ)+1
(
M
m
)
(1 − δN)m(δN)M−m
(
m − N¯(τ)
m
)N−1
.
For given τ > t j·m·g this expression converges to 1 as M grows large. The expected
payoff in period t j·m·g for player j · m · g from complying to the equilibrium strategy
is
u j(α) + δ1 − δu j(α) ,(A1)
while the maximal expected payoff from playing a strategy where in period t j·m·g
she chooses a best response to α− j is at least
c j(α) +
∞∑
τ=1
δτ
(
P(τ, M)u j(α) + (1 − P(τ, M))vmini
)
.(A2)
Thus, if M is sufficiently large for given δ, the expression in (A2) exceeds the one
in (A1), so that the original assessment cannot be an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Since v is in the relative interior of V ∗NE , we can find an ε > 0 and a payoff profile
vl ∈ VNE such that vli < vi − ε for all i. Then we can choose T ∈ N such that
vi − ε + T(vi − ε) > vmaxi + Tvli(A3)
for all i. Define
vh(δ) = 1
δNT
v − 1 − δ
NT
δNT
vl .(A4)
As v is in the relative interior of V ∗NE , we have vh(δ) ∈ V ∗NE if δ is sufficiently close
to 1. Assume now that there is a pure action profile a2 that generates vh(δ) and
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a Nash profile α1 that generates vl.11 Let all players play the starting-small strategy
mentioned in the text. The expected payoff Ei of a new player in role i is then12
Ei =
(
1 − δN−1)[vli + δEi
]
+ (1 − δN−1)δN−1[vli + δvli + δ2 Ei
]
+ · · ·
+ (1 − δN−1)δ(N−1)(T−1)[vli + · · · + δT−1vli + δT Ei
]
+ (1 − δN−1)δ(N−1)T [vli + · · · + δT−1vli + δT vhi + δT+1 Ei
]
+ (1 − δN−1)δ(N−1)(T+1)[vli + · · · + δT−1vli + δT vhi + δT+1vhi + δT+2 Ei
]
+ · · · .
Simplifying this expression yields
Ei = vli + δNvli + · · · + δN(T−1)vli + δNT vhi + δN(T+1)vhi + · · · +
δ − δN
1 − δN Ei .
Rearranging this equality gets us
Ei = 1 − δ
NT
1 − δ v
l
i +
δNT
1 − δ v
h
i (δ) .
The definition in (A4) implies that (1 − δ)Ei = vi for all i. It remains to show that
the starting-small strategy supports an equilibrium if δ is sufficiently close to 1.
Whenever profile α1 is played, there is no opportunity to deviate profitably. Assume
now that a2 is supposed to be played. The expected payoff of a player in role i from
compliance is given by
1
1 − δN v
h
i (δ) +
δ − δN
1 − δN Ei ,
while the expected payoff for this player from deviating is at most
vmaxi + δEi .
For δ → 1 the difference between these two expressions becomes
vi − vmaxi + T
(
vi − vli
)
> 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from (A3). Thus, if δ is sufficiently close to 1, no
player can profitably deviate from the starting-small strategy. Finally, all players
always (weakly) prefer MT to Q, since the punishment phase is played at the start
of any new group. Q.E.D.
11 If there does not exist a pure action profile a2 that generates vh(δ) (a single
Nash profile α1 that generates vl), we can replace it with a public randomization with
a2(wt) ∈ A (α1(wt) ∈ ΣNE ) for each wt that yields us an expected payoff of vh(δ) (of
vl). The proof essentially remains the same.
12 Without loss of generality we here assume that T ≥ 2.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Since v is in the relative interior of V ∗, we have
ui
(
αˆ21, αˆ
1
2
) ≤ ui(αˆi) < vi(A5)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Choose a small ε > 0 and T ∈ N such that
vmini − ε + T(vi − ε) > vmaxi + Tui
(
αˆ21, αˆ
1
2
)(A6)
for all i. We construct a starting-small strategy with (αˆ21, αˆ12) as punishment-phase
profile. If the min–max profiles are not pure action profiles, we can condition the
payoffs in the normal phase on the realized action profiles in the punishment phase
in a way that makes each player indifferent between her actions in each period of
the punishment phase. Define
vh(δ, ht) = 1
δNT
v − 1 − δ
NT
δNT
ui
(
αˆ21, αˆ
1
2
)
− 1 − δ
N
δNT
t−1∑
τ=t−T
δ(τ−t+T )N
[
ui(a
τ) − ui
(
αˆ21, αˆ
1
2
)]
.
(A7)
Since v is in the relative interior of V ∗, we have vh(δ, ht) ∈ V ∗ for any ht ∈ H if δ
is sufficiently close to 1. Choose a public randomization a(wt, ht), which for each
ht ∈ H yields an expected period payoff of vh(δ,ht). Consider the following starting-
small strategy for players in role i ∈ {1,2}: Always choose MT ; when you start in
a new group, start in phase I below; as long as you are matched to this group, choose
the following path of play:
1. Phase I: Choose αˆ−ii in T subsequent periods and then switch to phase II.
2. Phase II: If phase II starts in period t, then choose ai(wt, ht) in period t and all
subsequent periods as long as there has been no deviation from profile a(wt, ht)
in period t and ever since. After any deviation, switch to phase I.
The inequality in (A5) ensures that if δ is sufficiently close to 1, it does not pay
for players in role i to play a best response against αˆi−i in phase I and to quit the
relationship (because the highest possible period payoff in the punishment phase is
strictly smaller than the expected period payoff in the normal phase, and in a new
group phase I would start anew). The equality in (A7) ensures that no player in
role i gains by choosing a profile different from αˆ−ii in phase I and to maintain the
relationship (because any gain will be wiped out in the normal phase). The inequality
in (A6) ensures that there is no profitable deviation in phase II if δ is sufficiently
close to 1. Finally, the equality in (A7) ensures that the expected normalized payoff
of a new player in role i is given by vi if all players comply with the starting-small
strategy. Q.E.D.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Let the action profiles a, a1, and a2 with the properties in (1) and (2) be given. For
each role i ∈ {1, 2} choose w¯i ∈ (0, 1) such that
w¯iui(a) + (1 − w¯i)ui(ai) = 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)
.(A8)
(1) ensures that this is possible. We now propose a strategy for players in role
i ∈ {1, 2} that will support an equilibrium with the desired properties: Choose MT
in all periods; when you start in a new group, start in phase I below; as long as you
belong to this group, choose the following path of play:
1. Phase I: If wt ∈ [0, 0.5], choose a1i ; otherwise choose a2i . If wt ∈ [0, 0.5] and
profile a1 has been played or if wt ∈ (0.5, 1] and profile a2 has been played,
switch to phase II. If the player in role j has deviated unilaterally, switch to
phase II j . If both players have deviated, switch to phase II.
2. Phase II j : If wt ∈ [0, w¯ j], choose ai; otherwise choose a ji . If wt ∈ [0, w¯ j] and
profile a has been played or if wt ∈ (w¯ j, 1] and a j has been played, switch to
phase II. If the player in role l has deviated unilaterally, switch to phase IIl . If
both players have deviated, switch to phase II.
3. Phase II: Choose ai . If profile a has been played or if both players have deviated,
remain in phase II. If the player in role j has deviated unilaterally, switch to
phase II j .
Since in each phase a profile from the set {a, a1, a2} is played, (1) guarantees
that in no phase do there exist Pareto-improving joint deviations to another phase.
The equality in (A8) ensures that in each phase each player (weakly) prefers MT
to Q. Thus, if this strategy supports an equilibrium, this equilibrium is weakly gs-
renegotiation-proof. We now show that this strategy supports an equilibrium if δ is
sufficiently close to 1. The expected payoff Ei of a new player in role i is given by
Ei = 1 − δ
2
1 − δ 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
) + δ
2
1 − δ ui(a) .(A9)
In phase I, a player in role i gets, by conforming, an expected payoff of either
(case 1)
ui(a
i) +
∞∑
τ=1
δτ2ui(a) + δ(1 − δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ2 Ei ,
or (case 2)
ui(a
−i) +
∞∑
τ=1
δτ2ui(a) + δ(1 − δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ2 Ei ,
depending on the realization of the public correlation device. From deviating in this
phase, she gets in case 1 an expected payoff of at most
ci(a
i) + δEi ,
while in case 2 she gets an expected payoff of at most
ci(a
−i) + δEi .
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For δ → 1 the difference between the expected payoffs in case 1 becomes
ui(a
i) − ci(ai) + ui(a) − 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)
,(A10)
and in case 2 it becomes
ui(a
−i) − ci(a−i) + ui(a) − 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)
.(A11)
The assumptions in (1) and (2) guarantee that the expressions in (A10) and (A11)
are strictly positive. Thus, if δ is sufficiently close to 1, no player can profitably
deviate in phase I. A similar argument shows that the player in role i cannot deviate
profitably in phase IIi if δ is sufficiently large. In phase II j , when wt ∈ (w¯ j, 1], the
player in role i = j gets by conforming
ui(a
j) +
∞∑
τ=1
δτ2ui(a) + δ(1 − δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ2 Ei ,
while from deviating in this phase, she gets an expected payoff of at most
vmaxi + δEi .
For δ → 1 the difference between these expressions becomes
ui(a
j) − vmaxi + ui(a) − 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)
,
which by the assumption in (1) and (2) is strictly positive. Thus, if δ is sufficiently
close to 1, no player can profitably deviate in phase II j when wt ∈ (w¯ j, 1]. In phase
II, the player in role i gets by conforming
ui(a) +
∞∑
τ=1
δτ2ui(a) + δ(1 − δ)
∞∑
τ=0
δτ2 Ei ,
while from deviating in this phase, she gets an expected payoff of at most
vmaxi + δEi .
For δ → 1 the difference between these expressions becomes
2ui(a) − vmaxi − 0.5
(
ui(a
1) + ui(a2)
)
,
which by the assumption in (2) is strictly positive. Thus, if δ is sufficiently close
to 1, no player can profitably deviate in phase II. Finally, phase II j is identical to
phase II when wt ∈ [0, w¯ j]. The result then follows directly from (A9). Q.E.D.
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